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Chapter 4
Police, Technique, and Ellulian 
Critique: Evaluating Just Policing
A ndy A lexis-Ba ker
since the attacks on the World trade center and the Pentagon on sep-
tember 11, 2001, many pacifist-minded christians have begun to explore 
differences between policing and warfare with the noble hope of limiting 
or even abolishing war as we know it. For example, catholic theologian 
Gerald schlabach has developed a theory he calls “just policing.” schla-
bach argues that the differences between policing and war are significant 
enough to merit a wholesale realignment of just war and pacifist thinking. 
Rather than justify war according to abstract criteria, just policing would 
draw upon international law to pursue suspected criminals, which should 
limit civilian casualties and the demonizing of individuals and groups.1 if 
just war theorists would honestly explore these distinctions, they might 
recognize that policing is more appropriate to christian duty than war. if 
pacifists would “support, participate, or at least not object to operations 
with recourse to limited but potentially lethal force,” then a rapprochement 
might occur between just war theorists and pacifists through policing.2
in God’s Politics, Jim Wallis claims that since 9/11 many christians 
have re-read Jacques ellul, “who explained his decision to support the resis-
tance movement against nazism by appealing to the ‘necessity of violence’ 
1. schlabach, Just Policing, Not War, 4.
2. ibid., 3.
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but wasn’t willing to call such recourse ‘christian.’”3 similarly, christian 
pacifists might respond to terrorism, Wallis claimed, by advocating that the 
international community create a global police force to deal with violations 
of international law and human rights.4 such a force, Wallis wrote, is “much 
more constrained, controlled, and circumscribed by the rule of law than is 
the violence of war, which knows few real boundaries.”5
Wallis’ suggestion that ellul’s works may help to formulate a response 
to terrorism, and that such a response ought to be “policing” raises the 
question of what an ellulian analysis of policing might look like. ellul was 
after all an anarchist and viewed the police as a manifestation of technique. 
in fact, his most famous text, The Technological Society, uses the police as 
an example of technique over thirty times. in what follows, i will use el-
lul—rather than summarize his views—to critique just policing. Those who 
advocate for just policing have not adequately tested whether police are less 
violent because of the rule of law, nor have they generally considered the 
possibility that policing may in fact sustain or even worsen violence, not 
lessen it.
The Importance of Histor y
at the outset of his book The Technological Society, ellul decries the schol-
arly tendency to reduce technique to machines, stating that this “is an 
example of the habit of intellectuals of regarding forms of the present as 
identical with that of the past.”6 But the caveman’s tool differs qualitatively 
from modern technology. This same bad habit applies to current reflections 
on police. Police have not always existed; they are a modern invention.
Greco-Roman cities did not employ officials to prevent or detect 
common criminal activity; citizens themselves performed these tasks.7 
athenian law centered on private prosecution, which meant that the victim 
or the victim’s family prosecuted the perpetrator in athenian courts. For 
public crime like stealing city property, any citizen could prosecute and 
3. Wallis, God’s Politics, 166.
4. ibid., 164–67.
5. ibid., 166.
6. ellul, Technological Society, 3.
7 For more on law enforcement in ancient athens and Rome see cohen, Law, 
Violence, and Community in Classical Athens and nippel, Public Order in Ancient Rome. 
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would do the necessary detective work and witness solicitation.8 athenians 
usually settled disputes through negotiation, mediation, and arbitration 
with minimal formal structures or authorities and stressed keeping peace 
over placing blame. to athenians, democracy meant “consensus rather 
than coercion, participation rather than delegation. at the judicial level, the 
principle of voluntary prosecution . . . was fundamental.”9 Far from pande-
monium, the athenian system worked well. a state police would have been 
unthinkable.
Roman society worked in a similar way. if a person witnessed a crime, 
they cried out for those nearby to help capture the perpetrator and aid the 
victim. The Roman military never involved itself in such acts unless a riot 
or rebellion was about to ensue that would disrupt the flow of goods to 
Rome. classicist Wilfried nippel claims, “We do not even know to what de-
gree (if at all) the Roman authorities undertook prosecution of murder.”10
This informal “hue and cry” system prevailed through the Middle 
ages as see in chaucer’s “nun’s Priest’s tale.” as chaucer described it, the 
hue and cry involved shouting to draw attention to a crime. Those nearby 
gathered to witness, to help, to investigate and even to right the wrong. 
They might form a posse comitatis, led by the shire reeve (later called “sher-
iff ”) who was an estate manager, to hunt for a fleeing felon. The entire 
process was a community activity, not the responsibility of a professional 
police. This description is confirmed in legal codes throughout europe. For 
instance, the municipal code of cuenca, spain, published around 1190 ce, 
describes city employees such as judges, an inspector of market weights, 
a bailiff to guard incarcerated individuals, a town crier and guards for ag-
riculture. But the code does not mention any officials to detect or prevent 
crime. at most, medieval cities had night watchmen, who were not police 
but firemen who might also warn of other dangers.
The american colonies used the hue and cry and night watch system, 
memorialized in Paul Revere’s night-time warning, “The British are com-
ing!” The english-speaking world developed professionalized preventative 
policing during the nineteenth century. in america, these police forces 
evolved along two paths. southern police forces evolved from state-man-
dated slave patrols, which monitored every aspect of slave life to prevent 
revolts. These armed patrols morphed into southern police forces before 
8. Hunter, Policing Athens, 125.
9. ibid., 188.
10. nippel, Public Order in Ancient Rome, 2.
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and after the civil War. despite occasional white protests, the police car-
ried firearms because, they claimed, the shadowy fear of slave revolts and 
the mythical physical prowess of a revolting slave necessitated well-armed 
police.11 Most southern police departments, however, formed postbellum, 
simply taking over slave patrol disciplinary methods and applying them 
to the newly freed back populations through arrests on disorderly con-
duct, public intoxication, loitering, larceny and prostitution. Born in 1868, 
american historian and social activist W.e.B. duBois later said,
The police system of the south was originally designed to keep 
track of all negroes, not simply of criminals; and when the ne-
groes were freed and the whole south was convinced of the impos-
sibility of free negro labor, the first and almost universal device 
was to use the courts as a means of reenslaving the blacks. it was 
not then a question of crime, but rather one of color, that settled 
a man’s conviction on almost any charge. Thus negroes came to 
look upon courts as instruments of injustice and oppression, and 
upon those convicted in them as martyrs and victims.12
in the north, police departments emerged in the nineteenth century to sup-
press the “dangerous class.” in city after city police departments combated 
working class vices such as drinking and vagrancy, not violent crime. For 
instance, from 1873 to 1915 police superintendents in Buffalo, new York 
consistently requested increased funding to hire more police, citing as a 
reason not a rise in violent crime, but labor strikes.13 arrest records confirm 
this focus. The 1894 records from Buffalo—then a city of 300,000—show 
that police arrested 6,824 people for drunkenness, 4,014 for disorderly con-
duct, 4,764 for vagrancy, and 1,116 for being tramps.14 Yet they arrested 
only 98 people for felonious violence (murder, robbery and rape).15 The 
superintendents—invariably tied to big businesses—used “public order” 
arrests alongside more violent methods to break strikes and control unions.
Besides maintaining class order, northern police also helped consoli-
date political power. The police controlled elections by promoting turnout, 
monitoring voting stations, and harassing electoral opposition to the cur-
rent administration since new regimes usually replaced existing police with 
11. see Wagner, Disturbing the Peace.
12. du Bois, Souls of Black Folk, 145.
13. Harring, The Buffalo Police, 43.
14. ibid., 201.
15. ibid., 192.
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loyalists. This happened following elections in los angeles (1889), Kansas 
city (1895), chicago (1897), and Baltimore (1897).16 
understanding this history of policing is important. do the police 
represent a natural desire for security that is central to all societies, dis-
missals of which reveal a profound naiveté? or is modern policing a form 
of ellulian technique that represents, according to ellul, a profound shift in 
western history? My contention is that instead of promoting the common 
good or protecting the weak, police have historically promoted particular 
interests, siding with their employers and with dominant racial and eco-
nomic groups. Police technique is applicable to many areas, as ellul claimed. 
The police did not result from inevitable historical forces but from calcu-
lated moves to maintain social stratification that continue into the present. 
The Rule of Law Is an Illusion
Besides mistakenly making the police into an ancient and natural institu-
tion, the notion that the rule of law restrains police violence unlike the 
military remains untested. For ellul, the rule of law is a pure illusion: “We 
must unmask the ideological falsehoods of many powers, and especially 
we must show that the famous theory of the rule of law which lulls the 
democracies is a lie from beginning to end.”17 taking this statement seri-
ously, rule of law as it functions in just policing should be challenged at two 
levels. First, when the us military charges a soldier with a felony, such as 
abusing prisoners or killing civilians, 90 percent are convicted and most are 
incarcerated.18 By comparison, in 2009 only 33 percent of american police 
officers charged were convicted—even if they killed unarmed, innocent 
people—and only 64 percent of those convicted were incarcerated.19 These 
statistics contradict the assumption that the law moderates police behavior 
more so than that of the military.
16. see Fogelson, Big-City Police.
17. ellul, Anarchy and Christianity, 16.
18. according to the 2009 “annual Report of the code committee on Military Jus-
tice” 1,098 soldiers across all military branches were charged with the equivalent of a 
serious felony under military law. of those, 972 were convicted. 
19. The statistics on police misconduct are created by a non-Governmental orga-
nization called The national Police Misconduct statistics and Reporting Project and are 
“low-end estimates” based on news reports across the united states.
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More fundamentally, however, policing advocates have missed that 
police operate as a sovereign power that stands above the law through their 
discretionary powers whereby they determine when, where, and upon 
whom they will implement law. This discretionary power conflicts with 
western democratic theory, which gives pride of place to the rule of law. 
John locke, for example, argued that “settled and standing rules” should 
circumscribe discretionary authority; due process should prioritize indi-
vidual rights over coercive police powers; and the rule of law should protect 
citizens from arbitrary arrest and ensure their fair treatment while in cus-
tody, for “wherever law ends,” locke proclaimed, “tyranny begins.”20 locke 
prohibited discretion as tyrannical except in emergencies where “the safety 
of the people .  .  . could not bear a steady fixed route.”21 at that point the 
executive could “act according to discretion for the public good, without 
the prescription of the law, and sometimes even against it.”22 locke thus 
pushed discretion—a decision outside the law—to the edge of government, 
denying its necessity in quotidian governance.
echoing locke, Jeffrey Reiman argues that “police discretion begins 
where the rule of law ends: police discretion is precisely the subjection of 
law to a human decision beyond the law.”23 Because police operate in “low 
visibility” conditions, the only people likely to know that the police officer 
decided not to invoke the law are the police officer and the suspect. Thus 
discretionary decisions are unreviewable and risk becoming arbitrary and 
prejudiced, particularly in cases of racial profiling, police brutality and class 
bias. in using discretion, police act as sovereigns in a state of emergency 
and can disregard law. Thus the assumption that police operate under the 
rule of law ignores routine discretion that transforms the police from an in-
stitution that enforces law, into a sovereign institution that can act without 
lawful authority and even against the law.24 The police are thus an autono-
mous form of technique.
20. locke, Two Treatises of Government, 189, 90; Bk 2, §202.
21. ibid., 169; Bk 2, §56.
22. ibid., 172; Bk 2, §60. For a discussion of locke’s notion of prerogative see 
Pasquale, “locke on King’s Prerogative,” 198–208.
23. Reiman, “is Police discretion Justified in a Free society?” 74.
24. in the fictional HBo series, The Wire, which is a hard-hitting critique of not 
only current american policing, but other institutions as well, one of the seasoned police 
officers named Mcnulty tells his fellow officer: “let me let you in on a little secret. The 
patrolling officer on his beat is the one true dictatorship in america. We can lock a guy 
up on the humble, lock him up for real, or drink ourselves to death under the expressway 
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in states of emergencies, sovereigns suspend law and use their mo-
nopoly on violence most often in police actions both externally and in-
ternally. internally, the Holocaust was a police action within a state of 
emergency that Hitler had declared soon after his rise to power. during the 
Holocaust, the police did not violate German law; the entire operation was 
legal.25 These states of emergencies are not confined to totalitarian states. 
The united states, for instance, has experienced nearly uninterrupted states 
of emergencies since the 1800’s, using them to suppress labor disputes, de-
port “communists,” and to execute people in the civil War. Police actions 
are characteristic of sovereign power in times of national emergency, and 
this power has often been of the most brutal kind. These powers have been 
routine and are not exceptional at all, as ellul argues,
But so long as it faces crisis or encounters obstacles, the state 
does what it considers necessary, and following the nuremberg 
procedure it enacts special laws to justify action which in itself is 
pure violence. These are the “emergency laws,” applicable while the 
“emergency” lasts. every one of the so-called civilized countries 
knows this game.26 
Community, Policing, and Order
With discretionary powers, police primarily maintain order rather than 
enforce law. But, ellul would remind us:
This order has nothing spontaneous in it. it is rather a patient 
accretion of a thousand details. and each of us derives a feeling 
of security from every one of the improvements which make this 
order more efficient and the future safer. order receives our com-
plete approval; even when we are hostile to the police, we are by a 
strange contradiction, partisans of order.27 
and our side partners will cover us. no one, i mean no one, tells us how to waste our 
shift!” 
25. other scholars have also noted that the Holocaust was legal and a police action. 
see Berenbaum, “The impact of the Holocaust on contemporary ethics,” 256. quoting 
a nazi official Hannah arendt wrote, “only the police ‘possessed the experiences and 
the technical facilities to execute an evacuation of Jews en masse and to guarantee the 
supervision of the evacuees.’ The ‘Jewish state’ was to have a police governor under the 
jurisdiction of Himmler.” see arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, 76.
26. ellul, Violence, 86.
27. ellul, The Technological Society, 103.
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The trick for police is to make people “partisans of order,” and since the 
police represent order itself, we must see the police as indispensable. This is 
how community policing theory works.
community policing theorists have long recognized the distinction 
between law and order and therefore promote broader discretionary police 
power, not less. according to Joshua cohen and Joel Rogers, “‘community 
policing’ combines greater police/community cooperation with increased 
police discretion.”28 For them, procedural rules and laws inordinately restrict 
the police to observing an individual’s legal rights over the community’s 
well-being. Thus ostensibly minor issues such as panhandling, loitering, and 
vagrancy remain unchecked but grow into larger problems as they signal 
lack of communal welfare to criminally-prone outsiders who subsequently 
invade the neighborhood. community policing argues that police should 
have discretionary power to “clean up” these initial “disorders” even if their 
actions are not “easily reconciled with any conception of due process or fair 
treatment” and would probably “not withstand a legal challenge.”29
The underlying premise of community policing bifurcates and sim-
plifies community into “orderly” people (the community) and “disorderly” 
people (outsiders). it strips some people of rights and constructs a simpli-
fied community whose sole problems tend to be deviant outsiders and those 
inside who neglect quality of life issues like “broken windows.” The very 
word “community” connotes positive images, and masks the contested and 
complex nature of real communities. Furthermore, community policing 
deploys the word against some people and advocates that police be permit-
ted to use any means necessary to rid a “community” of these “disorders.” 
By putting cops back on the beat and giving them a seemingly friendly face 
in the creation and maintaining of white bourgeois order, police do exactly 
as ellul describes them in The Technological Society. They appear to protect 
“good citizens,” relieving the citizenry of any fear and by patrolling openly 
lose their secretive aura, and therefore are not felt to be oppressive. Thus 
most citizens do not seek to oppose or escape police technique because the 
police have removed any desire to escape. That is the ideal of technique: to 
make itself invisible and internalized in its object.30
But to do this it has to exclude some people from the notion of com-
munity. anybody who might cause “orderly” people to feel uncomfortable 
28. cohen, Urgent Times, xv.
29. Wilson, “Broken Windows,” 35, 31.
30. ellul, The Technological Society, 413.
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must be stripped of liberal rights and chased out. They do not have to be 
violent, but in the words of prominent community policing theorists merely 
“disorderly people. not violent people, nor, necessarily, criminals, but dis-
reputable or obstreperous or unpredictable people: panhandlers, drunks, 
addicts, rowdy teenagers, prostitutes, loiterers, the mentally disturbed.”31 
These are “broken windows” who if left unchecked will cause a spiral of 
crime and urban decay; indeed, they are the first signs of decay and must 
be eradicated with “zero tolerance” policies. This scapegoating mechanism 
has caused police to become much more violent toward these mere objects 
of police power.32
The Criminal Abstraction of the Technological Society
This scapegoating mechanism also reveals another problem in policing. 
From his experience working with gangs, ellul argued that preventing 
youth from sliding into a life of violence “could not consist in adapting 
young people to society.”33 For ellul, these youth were part of those “who 
do not conform to the level of efficiency society demands [and] are pushed 
aside.”34 Thus instead of helping them become professional bureaucrats, 
ellul took “a stand against the technological society” and helped them 
become rightly “maladjusted” themselves. He saw that society’s labeling 
of them as criminals and delinquents was simply part and parcel of the 
technological society.
More deeply, i think, the technological society must redefine such 
people as criminals and delinquents rather than enemies because criminal-
ity creates a permanent class of misfits to justify the state and its police. in 
just war thought—which, as a christian pacifist, i am also against—en-
emies rightly construed have a political agenda that obligates the other side 
to treat them with a certain degree of equality and fairness. at war’s end, 
people go home. and war ends eventually through some kind of negotia-
tion. But once that enemy is redefined as criminal, terrorist, or delinquent, 
they are depoliticized. instead of legitimate political claims, such people 
act out of insanity and hatred. one only needs to remember how those 
who planned the attacks on 9/11 were described and how no thought of 
31. Wilson, “Broken Windows,” 30.
32. alexis-Baker, “community, Policing and Violence,” 104–5.
33. ellul, In Season, Out of Season, 120.
34. ibid., 129.
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negotiation was countenanced to see that this re-labeling serves to create 
a permanent conflict and justify the state, including its police technique. 
The technique becomes much further entrenched and the violence more 
intractable with this shift in identity. 
International War in Police Garb
a global police force will only quicken the march of the technological 
society and is really only a technical solution to technological problems. 
ellul himself saw modern policing as a technique designed “to put . . . use-
less consumers to work.”35 techniques intertwine into a system so that a 
technique applies across disciplines. so policing naturally carries over into 
economics. When the emerging capitalist system called for more laborers, 
the police were created to put non-producers to work, outlawing loitering, 
gathering firewood and other necessities from the commons, all of which 
made it harder for non-producers to stay outside the emerging economic 
order. Thus technique expands. The police are no exception. it seems naïve 
to suggest that the police would not expand into economic techniques, for 
example, on the international order. What would a broken window look 
like on the international scene? Who are the “panhandlers, drunks, ad-
dicts, rowdy teenagers, prostitutes, loiterers, the mentally disturbed” that 
are the human embodiments of broken windows when one’s community 
is the whole world? if international broken windows must be addressed so 
that they do not invite a spiral of unrest and violence, who is to notice and 
fix these windows? in community policing theory it is an outside police 
force that aggressively drives out undesirable elements, often violating their 
rights in the name of community. it seems unfathomable that an interna-
tional police force would not be used to expand global capital markets.
Looking Outside the System
as one example of a non-technical way of thinking about security we might 
look to the Paez tribe in colombia, 100,000 people strong, who have com-
pletely disarmed their indigenous guard. This guard is not a professional 
force, but is made up of all volunteers and includes over 7,000 men, women 
and youth. They carry a three foot long baton decorated with various colors 
35. ellul, The Technological Society, 111.
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as a symbol of their authority, not as a weapon. When there is encroach-
ment on their territory they communicate via radios and many of them 
gather together to confront the intrusion and try to persuade them to leave 
(a hue and cry). This does not mean that such a decentralized, democratic, 
and nonviolent practice is always effective in warding off outside aggres-
sion: currently the tribe is facing increased pressure from both the gov-
ernment and the Revolutionary armed Forces of colombia (FaRc) rebels 
with encroachment from both sides. However at times they have been able 
to persuade the rebels to back off and to release hostages. They provide 
security at great personal risk to themselves and their communities. This 
is not really “policing,” in the normal sense of this word, but a communal 
practice of care and concern for communal well-being through resolving 
conflicts nonviolently.
Conclusion
Just policing advocates distinguish between war and policing in such a 
way that policing must necessarily be less violent than war. They have his-
torically maintained social stratification and expanded into new areas to 
justify their existence and operate not under the rule of law, but under the 
assumption that they should create order, a subjective concept that looks 
different to a radical anarchist than to a police officer. i have tried to dem-
onstrate the flaws in this argument. in the end, ellul’s statement on these 
distinctions holds true:
We hardly need to point out how simple-minded the distinction 
made by one of our philosophers is between “police” (internal), 
which would be legitimate as a means of constraint, and an “army,” 
which would be on the order of force. in the realm of politics these 
two elements are identical.36 
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